

# Estimating and forecasting using simple fiscal rules for euro area countries

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# Motivation

European sovereign debt crisis brought the implementation of fiscal rules to the forefront of many policy discussions.

- Targets for or restrictions on fiscal aggregates often seen as a useful policy to reach sustainable government finances.
- May reduce uncertainty about future policy decisions.

This paper specifies a fiscal rule and then:

- Measures fiscal policy behavior in the eurozone based on different structural indicators.
- Proposes a specification for a simple fiscal policy rule, forecasts future debt and primary balance paths based on this rule.

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# A rule in levels

General specification of Snower et al. (2011):

$$\frac{L_t}{Y_t} = k_t + a \left( 1 - \frac{\bar{Y}_t}{Y_t} \right) + c^{CR} \left( \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} - b^{CR} \right)_+ + e_t, \quad (1)$$

$$k_t = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{(1 + \bar{\pi}_t)(1 + \bar{g}_t)} \right) b^{CR}. \quad (2)$$

Alternatively, our generalization (as a primary surplus rule):

$$\frac{P_t}{Y_t} = k_t + a \left( 1 - \frac{\bar{Y}_t}{Y_t} \right) + c \left( \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} - b^* \right) + c^{CR} \left( \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} - b^{CR} \right)_+ + e_t; \quad (3)$$

$$k_t = \left( \frac{(1 + \bar{i}_t)}{(1 + \bar{\pi}_t)(1 + \bar{g}_t)} - 1 \right) b^*. \quad (4)$$

# The choice of $\bar{Y}_t$ and stationarity issues

Calculation of (unobservable) structural indicator variable necessary.

- Potential GDP and trend GDP are possible indicators.
- Model-contingent, not precisely measured, prone to revision.
- Implications for measured cyclicity.

(Near-) unit root behavior in the debt ratio:  $\rightarrow e_t$  might follow a random walk.

- Take equation (3) in first differences.
- Trend growth of output (vs. growth in trend output): More robust to unreliable estimates.

## A rule in first differences

Taking equation (3) in first differences, omitting  $c^{CR}$ :

$$\Delta \frac{P_t}{Y_t} = a \left( \frac{1}{1 + \bar{g}_t} - \frac{Y_{t-1}}{Y_t} \right) - c \Delta \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (5)$$

where  $\varepsilon_t$  equals  $\Delta e_t$ .

We add an additional term to capture additional consolidation which is required to push the debt-GDP ratio towards  $b^{CR}$ :

$$\Delta \frac{P_t}{Y_t} = a \left( \frac{1}{1 + \bar{g}_t} - \frac{Y_{t-1}}{Y_t} \right) + c \Delta \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + d^{CR} \left( \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} - b^{CR} \right) + \varepsilon_t. \quad (6)$$



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# Estimation procedure

- AMECO database, spliced to OECD data for Spain before 1995 and Italy before 1980.
- Output gap endogenously related to fiscal impulse → (nonlinear) 2SLS.
- Rule (3):  $e_t$  follows AR(1) with persistence coefficient  $\rho$ . Shift dummy for Germany post-reunification. Country fixed effects in pooled estimates.
- Rule (6): Blip dummy for Germany in 1991.
- Both rules, baseline:  $c^{CR}$  and  $d^{CR}$  omitted, respectively.

# Estimation results I

Panel estimates of all specifications (full sample):

<b>Level Specifications</b>				
		$c$	$a$	$\rho$
Potential GDP, full sample		0.081 (0.014)	0.493 (0.133)	0.717 (0.040)
Trend GDP, full sample		0.093 (0.017)	0.419 (0.100)	0.748 (0.039)
<b>First Diff. Specifications</b>				
	$const.$	$c$	$a$	
Potential GDP, full sample	0.000 (0.001)	0.087 (0.021)	0.443 (0.110)	
Trend GDP, full sample	-0.001 (0.001)	0.104 (0.022)	0.494 (0.096)	
Trend growth, full sample	-0.001 (0.001)	0.107 (0.022)	0.482 (0.095)	

Standard errors are given in parentheses.

# Estimation results II

Panel estimates of all specifications (post-1992):

<b>Level Specifications</b>		<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>	$\rho$
Potential GDP, post-1992		0.082 (0.023)	0.715 (0.161)	0.557 (0.068)
Trend GDP, post-1992		0.081 (0.032)	0.310 (0.126)	0.660 (0.065)
<b>First Diff. Specifications</b>		<i>const.</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>
Potential GDP, post-1992	0.000 (0.001)	0.116 (0.028)	0.893 (0.183)	
Trend GDP, post-1992	0.000 (0.001)	0.117 (0.029)	0.555 (0.153)	
Trend growth, post-1992	0.000 (0.001)	0.121 (0.029)	0.532 (0.149)	

Standard errors are given in parentheses.

## Estimation results III

The fiscal rule in differences (using growth in trend GDP):

Country	<i>const.</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>
France	-0.004 (0.002)	0.243 (0.087)	0.830 (0.257)
Germany	-0.007 (0.004)	0.567 (0.170)	0.618 (0.351)
Ireland	0.005 (0.005)	0.202 (0.108)	0.926 (0.612)
Italy	-0.001 (0.003)	0.141 (0.080)	-0.041 (0.327)
Spain	0.000 (0.002)	0.096 (0.059)	0.635 (0.206)
<i>Pooled</i>	-0.001 (0.001)	0.104 (0.022)	0.494 (0.096)

Standard errors are given in parentheses.

# Estimation details

- Country-specific coefficients vary greatly among specifications, not always precisely measured.
- Additionally: (pooled)  $c^{CR}$  may be positive,  $d^{CR}$  hard to tell.
- Time period matters in some cases.
- Evidence of debt stabilization in levels or growth rates.

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# Forecasting methodology I

- Start with data from AMECO database, use EC projections through 2014. Trend interest rate, inflation rate, growth rate of trend output equal to 1999-2012 average.
- Set up 'zero-fiscal' baseline level of actual and potential output, to account for endogeneity of output.
- Simple multiplier relationship:

$$Y_t = Y_t^* - mP_t. \quad (7)$$

- Similarly, for potential output:

$$\bar{Y}_t = \bar{Y}_t^* - m\bar{P}_t. \quad (8)$$



# Forecasting methodology II

- Trend primary surplus  $\bar{P}_t$  can be approximated by:

$$\bar{P}_t = \left( \frac{(1 + \bar{i}_t)}{(1 + \bar{\pi}_t)(1 + \bar{g}_t)} - 1 \right) B_{t-1}. \quad (9)$$

- Beyond 2014, assume that zero-fiscal log output gap ( $\log(Y_t^*/\bar{Y}_t^*)$ ) is equal to 0.8 times its previous value; zero-fiscal trend output grows at its trend rate  $\bar{g}_t$  which is set to the average growth in trend output from 1999-2012.

## Forecasting methodology III



- Then derive equilibrium fiscal balance implied by equations (6) and (7) in the years after 2014:

$$P_t = \frac{1}{1 + mj_t} (Y_t^* j_t - aY_{t-1}), \quad (10)$$

where:


$$j_t = \frac{P_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + c\Delta \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + d^{CR} \left( \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} - b^{CR} \right) + a \frac{1}{1 + \bar{g}_t} + \varepsilon_t. \quad (11)$$

# Forecasts for GERMANY




**Black:** Country-specific estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ , no correction factor. **Red:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ , no correction factor. **Blue:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ ,  $d^{CR} = 0.005$ . **Green:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ ,  $d^{CR} = 0.01$ .

# Forecasts for ITALY




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# Forecasts for SPAIN




**Black:** Country-specific estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ , no correction factor. **Red:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ , no correction factor. **Blue:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ ,  $d^{CR} = 0.005$ . **Green:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ ,  $d^{CR} = 0.01$ .

# Forecasts for FRANCE



**Black:** Country-specific estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ , no correction factor. **Red:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ , no correction factor. **Blue:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ ,  $d^{CR} = 0.005$ . **Green:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ ,  $d^{CR} = 0.01$ .

# Forecasts for IRELAND



**Black:** Country-specific estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ , no correction factor. **Red:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ , no correction factor. **Blue:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ ,  $d^{CR} = 0.005$ . **Green:** EA-wide estimates of  $a$  and  $c$ ,  $d^{CR} = 0.01$ .

# Summary

- Short-run debt levels are not very sensitive to consolidation coefficients, for reasonable parameters. Very sensitive in 'out years'.
- Forecasts depend greatly on expected growth rates, parameters.
- Simulations can detect pressure to engage in rapid consolidation.